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AMERICAN COMMON MARKET REDUX 
Richard Collins* 
The Tennessee Wine case, decided in June of 2019, had a major effect 
on the path of the law for an issue not argued in it. The Supreme Court 
affirmed invalidity of a protectionist state liquor regulation that discriminated 
against interstate commerce in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause 
doctrine (the Doctrine in this paper).1 Its holding rejected a vigorous defense 
based on the special terms of the Twenty-first Amendment that ended 
Prohibition—an issue of interest only to those involved in markets for 
alcoholic drinks.2 However, the Court’s opinion eliminated serious doubts 
about validity of the Doctrine itself, even though the petitioner and 
supporting amici curiae did not ask it to review the issue.3 The Doctrine was 
                                                                                                                           
 
* Professor, University of Colorado Law School. 
1 Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 139 S. Ct. 2449 (2019). “Protectionism is the 
economic policy of restricting imports from, and exports to, other states or countries by tariffs, embargoes, 
quotas, and related regulations.” Protectionism, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Protectionism 
(last visited Aug. 11, 2020). 
2 See infra Part II. 
3 See Petition for Certiorari at 6, Tenn. Wine, 139 S. Ct. 2449 (No. 18-96) (sole question presented 
based on Amend. XXI); Petitioner’s Brief, Tenn. Wine, 139 S. Ct. 2449 (No. 18-96); Brief for Mich. Beer 
& Wine Wholesalers Ass’n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Tenn. Wine, 139 S. Ct. 2449 (No. 
18-96); Brief of Amicus Curiae KHBC Partners II, Ltd. in Support of Petitioner, Tenn. Wine, 139 S. Ct. 
2449 (No. 18-96); Brief of Wine & Spirits Wholesalers of Tenn., Inc. as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Petitioner, Tenn. Wine, 139 S. Ct. 2449 (No. 18-96); Amici Curiae Brief of U.S. Alcohol Pol’y All. & 
Pub. Health Researchers & Advoc. in Support of Petitioner, Tenn. Wine, 139 S. Ct. 2449 (No. 18-96); 
Brief Amici Curiae of Nat’l Conf. of State Legislatures, Nat’l Ass’n of Cntys., Nat’l League of Cities, 
U.S. Conf. of Mayors, Int’l City/County Mgmt. Ass’n & Int’l Mun. Law. Ass’n in Support of Petitioners, 
Tenn. Wine, 139 S. Ct. 2449 (No. 18-96); Brief for Ill., Ala. Ark., Colo., Conn., Del., D.C., Fla., Ga., 
Idaho, Ind., Iowa, Kan., Ky., La., Mass, Mich., Miss., Mont., Nebr., N.Y., N.C., N.D., Ohio, Okla., Pa., 
R.I., S.C., S.D., Tex., Utah, Vt., Va., Wash., W. Va. & Wis. as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, 
Tenn. Wine, 139 S. Ct. 2449 (No. 18-96); Brief of Amer. Bev. Licensees as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Petitioner, Tenn. Wine, 139 S. Ct. 2449 (No. 18-96); Brief of Amicus Curiae Consumer Action in Support 
of Petitioner, Tenn. Wine, 139 S. Ct. 2449 (No. 18-96); Brief of Amicus Curiae Open Markets Inst. in 
Support of Petitioner, Tenn. Wine, 139 S. Ct. 2449 (No. 18-96); Brief of Major Brands, Inc. as Amicus 
Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Tenn. Wine, 139 S. Ct. 2449 (No. 18-96); Brief of Nat’l Alcohol Beverage 
Control Ass’n & Nat’l Liquor L. Enf’t Ass’n as Amici Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Tenn. Wine, 139 
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established by 19th century Supreme Court decisions that set the legal 
framework for the American common market—until Justices advocating the 
Doctrine’s abolition seemed close to a majority early in the present century.4 
The Tennessee Wine opinion eliminated that threat for the foreseeable 
future.5 
I. THE AMERICAN COMMON MARKET 
A. Established 
Interstate commerce generated major legal disputes as soon as we parted 
from the British Empire. Unsuccessful attempts at legal rules to promote it 
were made in the Continental Congress under the Articles of Confederation. 
Their failure was a major incentive (many claim the most important) for 
calling the Constitutional Convention.6 Among the rights granted to the new 
federal government was the power “To regulate Commerce with foreign 
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes,” the 
Commerce Clause.7 As law students know well, it is the most often 
adjudicated passage in the original text.8 
                                                                                                                           
 
S. Ct. 2449 (No. 18-96); Brief of Nat’l Beer Wholesalers Ass’n as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, 
Tenn. Wine, 139 S. Ct. 2449 (No. 18-96); Brief of Ctr. for Alcohol Pol’y as Amicus Curiae in Support of 
Petitioner, Tenn. Wine, 139 S. Ct. 2449 (No. 18-96); Brief of Wine & Spirits Wholesalers of Am., Inc. as 
Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, Tenn. Wine, 139 S. Ct. 2449 (No. 18-96). 
4 See infra notes 30–36 and accompanying text. 
5 The precedents and chance of reversal are explained in the text and notes below. In addition to 
the constitutional doctrines addressed by the Court, two others were argued but ignored. See infra notes 
21, 130. 
6 See MAX FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 7–12 (Yale 
Univ. Press 1913) (“Interference with the arteries of commerce was cutting off the very life-blood of the 
nation, and something had to be done. The articles of confederation provided no remedy, and it was 
evident that amendments to that document, if presented in the ordinary way, were not likely to succeed. 
Some other method of procedure was necessary, and a promising way had already been opened . . . . 
Whatever complex of causes there may have been, the sequence of events resulting in this convention 
was, as outlined, the apparent impossibility of obtaining from the states the necessary amendments to vest 
in congress adequate powers in taxation and commerce, the calling of a trade convention, and then the 
calling of a general convention . . . .”). See also Tenn. Wine, 139 S. Ct. at 2449 and authorities cited. 
7 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. 
8 All constitutional law casebooks devote more pages to this provision than to any other part of the 
1787 text, although the Fourteenth Amendment gets much more. See, e.g., ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 155–215, 444–88 (6th ed. 2020). 
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Congress often uses the commerce power to establish federal regulation 
of interstate or international transportation or markets, and many legal 
contests test the power’s boundaries.9 It can instead pass laws that leave 
commercial regulation to states but protect interstate commerce against 
parochial state laws. But this power is virtually never used. The likely reason 
is the Supreme Court’s assumed authority to define and defend our domestic 
common market based on the Commerce Clause.10 Not overnight; the process 
stretched over much of the nineteenth century.11 An antecedent claim, which 
would have established national control of all domestic markets, was made 
to the Marshall Court in the famous 1824 case that overturned New York’s 
law imposing a monopoly on the right to operate steamships in state waters.12 
Represented by Daniel Webster, the monopoly’s opponents argued that the 
Commerce Clause gave Congress exclusive power of commercial regulation, 
leaving none to the states. Without dissent, the Court discussed the claim 
extensively and in favorable terms, concluding, “There is great force in this 
argument, and the Court is not satisfied that it has been refuted.”13 But the 
Court decided the case against New York based on preemption of the state 
law by a federal statute, so the quoted statement was dictum.14 
Of course, the 1824 dictum inspired litigants to renew the claim. The 
Marshall Court embraced Webster’s theory in a foreign commerce decision 
overturning a state law requiring importers to buy a state license.15 But the 
theory was then limited by that Court and rejected by most justices on the 
more states-rights (slavery protecting) Taney Court (1836–1864).16 In 1852 
                                                                                                                           
 
9 See, e.g., Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sibelius, 567 U.S. 519 (2012) (regarding the Affordable 
Care Act); Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005) (regarding marijuana regulation). 
10 The Tenn. Wine Court recognized another reason why the power is seldom used to guard 
interstate commerce. Tenn. Wine, 139 S. Ct. at 2461 n.4 (2019) (“Even at the time of the adoption of the 
Constitution, it would have been asking a lot to require that Congress pass a law striking down every 
protectionist measure that a State or unit of local government chose to enact.”). 
11 See infra notes 12–21 and accompanying text. 
12 See Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 3 (1824). 
13 Id. at 209. 
14 Id. at 209–21. 
15 See Brown v. Maryland, 25 U.S. (12 Wheat.) 419, 445 (1827) (alternative holding). 
16 See Willson v. Black-Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245 (1829) (sustaining state statute 
authorizing dam on navigable creek). The leading Taney Court decision before Cooley, infra, was The 
License Cases, 46 U.S. (5 How.) 504 (1847) (sustaining state laws requiring licenses to sell liquor 
including that imported from other states). For license rules that do not discriminate against interstate or 
foreign commerce, this decision was consistent with common market doctrine and remains good law. 
 
134 JOURNAL OF LAW AND COMMERCE [Vol. 39:131 
 
Vol. 39, No. 2 (2021) ● ISSN: 2164-7984 (online) ● ISSN 0733-2491 (print)  
DOI 10.5195/jlc.2021.212 ● http://jlc.law.pitt.edu 
the Cooley decision squarely rejected Webster’s theory of exclusive federal 
power over interstate and foreign commerce.17 A Pennsylvania law required 
all vessels sailing into or out of Philadelphia to employ a local pilot. In a suit 
to enforce the law, defendant Cooley argued that the state law violated the 
Commerce Clause. A federal statute claimed power over pilots but 
authorized state regulation. The Supreme Court sustained validity of both the 
federal and the state statutes, so Cooley lost.18 But the Court’s opinion said 
that other subjects of the interstate commerce power that “are in their nature 
national, or admit only of one uniform system, or plan of regulation, may 
justly be said to of such a nature as to require uniform regulation by 
Congress.”19 
The 1852 dictum could have been forgotten. Instead, the post-Civil War 
Court embraced it in holdings overturning state laws that impeded interstate 
commerce.20 Employing the incremental system of the common law, the 
Court evolved rules to define which state laws are invalid and thus to 
establish our domestic common market. Common markets also require 
equality of citizenship and free movement of persons for economic purposes. 
Both are guaranteed to Americans by other constitutional rules.21 
                                                                                                                           
 
17 See Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens of the Port of Phila., 53 U.S. (12 How.) 299 (1852). 
18 Id. at 319–21. 
19 Id. at 319. The opinion did not try to identify which subjects are exclusively national. 
20 See Barry Friedman & Daniel T. Deacon, A Course Unbroken: The Constitutional Legitimacy of 
the Dormant Commerce Clause, 97 VA. L. REV. 1877 (2011); Norman R. Williams, The Foundations of 
the American Common Market, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 409 (2008); Albert S. Abel, The Commerce 
Clause in the Constitutional Convention and in Contemporary Comment, 25 MINN. L. REV. 432, 443–44 
(1941); Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 139 S. Ct. 2449, 2459–61 (2019). Arguably the 
Court’s first common market holding after Cooley was the pre-War tax invalidation in Hays, although it 
did not invoke the Commerce Clause. Hays v. Pac. Mail SS Co., 58 U.S. (17 How.) 596 (1855). 
21 Edwards v. California, 324 U.S. 160 (1941); Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. 35 (1867) (insuring 
free interstate movement of persons). Ward v. Maryland, 79 U.S. 418 (1871) (art. IV, § 2 forbids state 
laws discriminating against citizens of other states in private market opportunities); Saenz v. Roe, 526 
U.S. 489 (1999) (14th Amend. forbids many state laws discriminating against new residents in eligibility 
for state rights and benefits). The latter ruling could be extended to overturn protectionist residence rules 
like Tennessee’s. In Tenn. Wine, one respondent’s brief and two amici curiae briefs argued that it should 
be, but everyone else, including the courts, ignored this theory. See Brief for Respondent Affluere 
Investments, Inc. at 44–93, Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 139 S. Ct. 2449 (2019); 
Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Respondent Affluere Investments, Inc. at 26–30, 
Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 139 S. Ct. 2449 (2019); Brief Amicus Curiae of Pacific 
Legal Foundation in Support of Respondents at 11–13, Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 
139 S. Ct. 2449 (2019). 
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From the 1920s, the Court’s jurisprudence developed alongside 
international research and negotiations leading to formation of the General 
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) adopted in 1947 to govern 
international trade among signatory nations, and of the 1957 Treaty of Rome 
defining the European Common Market, now the European Union (EU).22 
Indeed, one can match EU treaty provisions directly to American rules.23 The 
Court relied on Marshall Court’s opinions to adopt “dormant Commerce 
Clause doctrine” as the moniker for its common market rules.24 
Common markets and trade treaties are often associated with the tag line 
“free trade.” A better description is trade free of specified parochial barriers. 
Current Supreme Court doctrine, in place since 1980, has three basic rules. 
State regulations and taxes challenged under the dormant Commerce Clause 
doctrine are valid unless they (1) discriminate against interstate or foreign 
commerce, or (2) impose other burdens on interstate or foreign trade that the 
Court deems excessive (the undue burden rule).25 (3) State subsidies in favor 
of their domestic commerce that resemble forbidden discriminations are 
                                                                                                                           
 
22 GATT has been supplanted by the World Trade Organization, although WTO incorporates 
GATT’s text. See From the GATT to the WTO: A Brief Overview, GEO. L. LIBR., https://guides.ll. 
georgetown.edu/c.php?g=363556&p=4108235 (last visited Aug. 11, 2020). 
23 Treaty of Rome provisions that conceptually match American rules (1) and (2) (defined in text 
and notes below) include 1957 Articles 3(a) & (c), 9, 12, 30, 34.1 & 95.1. Treaty of Rome, Mar. 25, 1957, 
298 U.N.T.S. 3, https://ec.europa.eu/romania/sites/romania/files/tratatul_de_la_roma.pdf (last visited 
Aug. 11, 2020). Decisions of the European Court of Justice enforcing EU treaties have refined common 
market theory substantially. The court is described at: Court of Justice of the European Union (CJEU), 
EUR. UNION, https://europa.eu/european-union/about-eu/institutions-bodies/court-justice_en (last visited 
Aug. 11, 2020). Its foundational decisions refining common market concepts are reviewed in WILLIAM 
PHELAN, GREAT JUDGMENTS OF THE EUROPEAN COURT OF JUSTICE: RETHINKING THE LANDMARK 
DECISIONS OF THE FOUNDATIONAL PERIOD (2019). 
24 “Dormant Commerce Clause doctrine” appeared four times in Tenn. Wine, once in the majority 
and three times in the dissenting opinions. Tenn. Wine, 139 S. Ct. 2449, 2469, 2477. This caption first 
appeared in a dissent long after the Doctrine had been well established in case law. Hill v. Florida, 325 
U.S. 538, 547 (1945) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting). The Marshall Court origins were Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 189 (1824) (when unused by Congress, the commerce power must “lie dormant”) and 
Willson v. Black-Bird Creek Marsh Co., 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 245, 252 (1829) (“the power to regulate 
commerce in its dormant state”). Some justices opposed to the Doctrine prefer the gloomier term “negative 
commerce clause.” E.g., infra Justice Thomas’s quote in text at note 36. 
25 Leading modern precedents are (1) Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1976) (holding 
state law barring trash imports illegally discriminated against interstate commerce); (2) for regulations: 
Kassel v. Consol. Freightways Corp., 450 U.S. 662 (1981) (holding Iowa limit on length of trucks passing 
through the state imposed an undue burden on interstate commerce); (3) for taxes: Complete Auto Transit, 
Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977) (detailing tax law rules). See infra notes 56–71 and accompanying text. 
For discussion of a purported but erroneous additional rule, see infra notes 100–122. 
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nevertheless immune from the Doctrine (the market participant rule).26 The 
Court sustains any act of Congress that overrides a Supreme Court rule; the 
Doctrine applies only when congressional power is, well, dormant.27 Thus, 
Congress could abolish the Doctrine by an ordinary statute, or restore it were 
the Court to do so. This gives the Doctrine a degree of democratic legitimacy. 
In the context of the Tennessee Wine decision, Congress could modify or 
overrule the Court. 
B. Opposed 
Individual justices have often dissented from decisions enforcing the 
dormant Commerce Clause doctrine. In some cases, dissenters objected to 
majority mistakes.28 Much more common are ad hoc votes finding a state’s 
particular justification sufficient. Policy preferences show up. Conservative 
justices are more likely to favor state regulations over federal power; liberal 
votes are more likely to sustain state tax laws.29 But there are no clear cases 
in which a Supreme Court majority took this path. Unless they become 
frequent majorities, these dissents are of little consequence for the common 
market. 
Justices who assert that the Doctrine is categorically illegitimate are 
more important but only if there is a reasonable chance that they become the 
Court’s majority and vote to abolish it. From emergence of the Doctrine after 
the Civil War until the 1980s, there were never more than one or two 
                                                                                                                           
 
26 Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429 (1980) (South Dakota-owned cement plant’s preference for 
instate buyers was a subsidy immune from the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine). Reeves was 5-4, but 
dissents disappeared from later cases; the subsidy exception is well established. 
27 Prudential Ins. Co. v. Benjamin, 328 U.S. 408, 415 (1946). Justice Rutledge wrote for a 
unanimous Court. He may have had the Court’s best understanding of trade theory but died after only six 
years on it. Later opinions have often referred to his, notably in Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 
supra note 25 and infra notes 68 & 91. Although congressional power to override the Court is clear, it has 
been used very seldom. By implication, Congress supports the Doctrine. 
28 See infra notes 84–85, 90, 92–93, 94, 97 and accompanying text. 
29 Statistical support for this statement would take too many citations for a short paper. See, for 
example, Philadelphia, 437 U.S. 617 and Kassel, 450 U.S. 662 for a sampling of conservative dissents in 
regulatory cases. For liberal dissents in tax cases, see, for example, Spector Motor Serv. v. O’Connor, 340 
U.S. 602 (1951), McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327 (1944) infra notes 90–92. On the ambiguous 
views of Justice Black and Chief Justice Rehnquist, see infra note 30. 
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members making this claim.30 Then original intent and textualist 
jurisprudence, championed by Justices Scalia and Thomas and supported by 
the Federalist Society and its allies, changed the calculus.31 Justice Scalia’s 
first term on the Court included three complex cases that induced him to 
express his view that the Doctrine was illegitimate.32 But he adopted an 
intermediate position, to follow Rule (1) and limit his adherence to Rule (2) 
to clear precedents.33 Justice Thomas was slower to come out against the 
Doctrine. But he jumped in with both feet in 1997. A Maine property tax 
statute discriminated against interstate commerce in favor of local charities, 
making a sympathetic case for an exception to the Doctrine but no logical 
way to avoid collateral application of an exception to less empathetic 
situations.34 The Court split 5-4, the majority holding the law invalid.35 
Sympathy likely accounted for Justice Ginsburg’s dissenting vote. Justice 
Thomas, joined by Rehnquist and Scalia, took the occasion for a vehement 
attack on the Doctrine: “The negative Commerce Clause has no basis in the 
text of the Constitution, makes little sense, and has proved virtually 
unworkable in application,” followed by 31 pages of elaboration.36 Three 
votes for abolition combined with political support for new appointees 
committed to original intent and textualist jurisprudence made the Doctrine’s 
future uncertain. 
                                                                                                                           
 
30 Justice Black (1937–1971) almost always dissented from enforcement of the Doctrine and at 
times seemed to argue that it was illegitimate. See, e.g., H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 
525, 545–63 (1948) (Black, J., dissenting); J.D. Adams Mfg. Co. v. Storen, 304 U.S. 307, 316–33 (1938) 
(Black, J., dissenting). Justice Douglas (1939–1975) and Justice Murphy (1940–1949) often dissented 
case-by-case but did not claim that the Doctrine was mistaken. See, e.g., McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth Co., 
322 U.S. 327, 332–35 (1944) (Douglas, J., dissenting). Chief Justice Rehnquist (1978–2005) dissented 
from most decisions enforcing the Doctrine based on support for whatever justification was offered by 
the state. See, e.g., infra notes 58 & 78. He joined Justice Scalia’s 1987 opinion questioning the Doctrine’s 
legitimacy and Justice Thomas’s 1997 opinion advocating repeal, but his own opinions did not assert that 
position. See infra note 36 and accompanying text. 
31 See The Great Debate: Interpreting Our Written Constitution, FEDERALIST SOC’Y, https://fedsoc 
.org/commentary/publications/the-great-debate-interpreting-our-written-constitution (last visited 
Aug. 11, 2020). 
32 Am. Trucking Ass’ns v. Scheiner, 483 U.S. 266, 303 (1987) (Scalia, J., dissenting); Tyler Pipe 
Indus. v. Wash. State Dep’t of Revenue, 483 U.S. 232, 254 (1987) (Scalia, J., concurring in part and 
dissenting in part): CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 94–98 (1987) (Scalia, J., 
concurring in part and concurring in the judgment). 
33 See Tyler Pipe Indus., 483 U.S. at 254. 
34 See Camps Newfound/Owatonna v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564 (1997). 
35 Id. 
36 Id. at 609–40. 
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Justice Thomas’s opinion calling for abolition laid out two distinct 
grounds: that the Doctrine lacked specific support in constitutional text and 
was thus inconsistent with original intent, and it was senseless and 
unworkable. The following sections examine these claims. 
1. Text and Original Intent 
Lack of precisely explicit text is a given. But unlike many modern 
quarrels about original intent, the American market is not an issue that was 
unknown to founding-era America. To the contrary, it was one of the great 
questions of the day, providing plenty of fuel for discussion.37 No one 
disputes the proposition that the Commerce Clause was intended to address 
market problems. However, knowledge about how to do so was tentative and 
evolving. Private, interstate business corporations that now dominate the 
economy were rare and their legal status murky.38 The issue nicely fits 
Madison’s Federalist essay opining that all new laws are “more or less 
obscure and equivocal, until their meaning be liquidated and ascertained by 
a series of particular discussions and adjudications.”39 
The Tennessee Wine Court could have simply taken the Doctrine as 
received law based on precedent, as the Court often does when no one argues 
to the contrary. Instead, the opinion took original intent head on and made a 
convincing case that the Framers intended to create an American common 
market, even if they were uncertain about its mechanisms.40 The opinion 
noted that “removing state trade barriers was a principal reason for the 
adoption of the Constitution,” the Convention’s “discussion of the power to 
regulate interstate commerce was almost uniformly linked to the removal of 
state trade barriers,” and in ratifying state conventions, “fostering free trade 
among the States was prominently cited as a reason for ratification.”41 It cited 
essays in The Federalist that criticized state protectionism and touted the 
benefits of a free national market.42 
                                                                                                                           
 
37 See FARRAND, supra note 6. 
38 See FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF CORPORATIONS § 2 (2020); infra notes 46–47 and 
accompanying text. 
39 THE FEDERALIST NO. 37, at 236 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1981). 
40 See Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 139 S. Ct. 2449, 2459–61(2019). 
41 Id. at 2460. 
42 Id. (citing THE FEDERALIST NOS. 7, 11 (Alexander Hamilton), NO. 42 (James Madison)). 
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Those points are rarely contested. The battles are over how to interpret 
the constitutional text related to them. The Commerce Clause empowers 
Congress to promote trade, and other clauses expressly forbid certain 
commercial discriminations. As the Tennessee Wine Court noted, additional 
provisions that showed intent to have a national common market were the 
Privileges and Immunities (“P & I”) Clause of Article IV and the Import-
Export Clause of Article I.43 Both were hobbled by narrow interpretations in 
19th century decisions. The Import-Export Clause was read to apply only to 
foreign commerce.44 That was a contestable interpretation, but reversing it 
would cover only tax discriminations, well short of the scope of the 
Doctrine.45 The broader rights guaranteed by the P & I Clause were denied 
to corporations before they became the dominant vehicle for American 
businesses.46 A good case can be made that even were that reading correct 
for the kinds of corporations in use at the founding, it should not have applied 
to the fully private business corporations that emerged later.47 The gist of the 
Tennessee Wine Court’s opinion is that the essential concept was intent to 
have a national common market. The founders’ inexact provisions for it 
reflected the imperfect knowledge of their time. That is sufficient support for 
the Doctrine, which can be and is refined with every decision of the Court, 
tempered by congressional power to modify it.48 
2. Coherence 
Justice Thomas’ claim that the Doctrine is incoherent and inconsistent 
in application has occasional support from academic critics.49 What does the 
                                                                                                                           
 
43 Id. (citing U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2, cl. 1; U.S. CONST. art. I, § 10, cl. 2). 
44 Woodruff v. Parham, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 123, 128 (1869). 
45 For an extended argument that Woodruff was wrong, see Camps Newfound/Owatonna, 520 U.S. 
at 621–37 (Thomas, J., dissenting). 
46 Bank of Augusta v. Earle, 38 U.S. (13 Pet.) 519 (1839). 
47 The opinion in Bank of Augusta implied that state-chartered banks comprised a large share of 
corporations at the time, that these were much involved with state governments and state sovereignty, and 
that this connection was important to the Court’s decision. Id. However, the Court has continued to adhere 
to the interpretation. See W. & S. Life Ins. Co. v. State Bd. of Equalization, 451 U.S. 648, 655–56 (1981). 
48 Tenn. Wine, 139 S. Ct. at 2459–61. 
49 See, e.g., DAVID P. CURRIE, THE CONSTITUTION IN THE SUPREME COURT: THE FIRST HUNDRED 
YEARS 1789–1888, at 342 (1985) (“a disaster”); Anthony L. Moffa & Stephanie L. Safdi, Freedom from 
the Costs of Trade: A Principled Argument Against Dormant Commerce Clause Scrutiny of Goods 
Movement Policies, 21 N.Y.U. ENV’T L.J. 344 (2014); Paul E. McGreal, The Flawed Economics of the 
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Court’s record show? Early on, one problem was uncertainty about common 
market theory. There was a general notion that discrimination against 
interstate and foreign commerce should be invalid,50 but the Court struggled 
to define what that meant in a complex field that the Court was, to some 
extent, creating. Another problem was the formalist style that dominated the 
Court’s jurisprudence in the late 19th Century, when the Doctrine was 
adopted.51 Opinions were often more absolute than facts and theory justified. 
A third cause, still at work, arose from reaction to the formalist style, 
requiring what is often termed realism; opinions are supposed to be based on 
how a rule actually functions.52 That in turn suffers from the Anglo-American 
tradition of generalist judges.53 Trade law is a specialized subject. Judges 
with no expertise in it approach it gingerly and make mistakes, though more 
often in articulation than application. That is, they get the right result but 
botch the explanation. Cases based on all three basic rules offer examples.54 
But trade theory has steadily improved over time, and the Court has 
accordingly corrected past errors.55 
Rule (1), forbidding discrimination against interstate or foreign 
commerce, overrides states’ regulations and taxes that discriminate against 
their imports or exports in favor of competing internal commerce, unless the 
                                                                                                                           
 
Dormant Commerce Clause, 39 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1191 (1998); Edmund W. Kitch, Regulation and 
the American Common Market, 6 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 119, 123 (1982) (“an idea of absolutely no 
merit”). See also Justice Rehnquist’s remark infra note 78. Many academic writers support the Doctrine. 
See Brief of Amici Curiae Law Professors in Support of Respondent Affluere Investments, Inc., Tenn. 
Wine, 139 S. Ct. 2449 (No. 18–96); Freidman & Deacon, supra note 20; Williams, supra note 20; Abel, 
supra note 20; infra note 115 (Regan, Denning & Martin). 
50 Abstract discussions in the Court’s opinions usually centered on some conception of 
discrimination. See, e.g., Bowman v. Chicago & Nw. Ry. Co., 125 U.S. 465, 508 (1888). 
51 See Morton J. Horwitz, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW, 1870–1960: THE CRISIS OF 
LEGAL ORTHODOXY 16–19, 198–200 (1992). 
52 See id. at 169–92, 199–200. On formalism and realism, see, for example, Brian Leiter, Legal 
Formalism and Legal Realism: What Is the Issue?, LEGAL THEORY (2010). 
53 For discussion of the generalist judicial tradition and its pluses and minuses, see Chad M. 
Oldfather, Judging, Expertise, and the Rule of Law, 89 WASH. U. L. REV. 847 (2012). For an example of 
a clumsy and mistaken formalist rule, see infra notes 83–87 and accompanying text on the former “original 
package” doctrine. 
54 For examples of opaque and confused opinions, see infra notes 67, 73, 74, 77–79, 90, 92, 97, 112 
and accompanying text. The incoherence claim is furthered by many constitutional law textbooks, which 
chop up the Doctrine into irrational pieces. See, e.g., JONATHAN D. VARAT, WILLIAM COHEN & VIKRAM 
D. AMAR, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: CASES & MATERIALS 285–364 (13th ed. 2009) (nine categories). 
Textbook authors are generalists, too. 
55 See, e.g., infra notes 87, 91 and accompanying text. 
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state can show a justifying purpose.56 This formulation covers several 
situations. For explicit state discriminations (tariffs, embargoes, and quotas), 
the rule in common market theory is nearly absolute.57 The only justifying 
state interest that has succeeded in a Supreme Court decision is a legitimate 
quarantine.58 This induces litigants to offer bad defenses that courts reject 
one by one, but feed incoherence claims.59 However, Rule (1) also forbids 
certain indirect discriminations, when a state bans or burdens a specific 
commodity that is mostly imported from or exported to other states. That is, 
a law explicitly discriminates against a commodity and not against imports 
or exports of it. When such laws favor a competing but different internal 
product or interest, a lawsuit may claim violation of Rule (1). The Court’s 
rule for such cases sustains the state’s discrimination if it has a plausible, 
nonprotectionist purpose, a low bar that states usually clear.60 But in a 
handful of cases, courts have overturned laws that lacked such a purpose and 
functioned like tariffs or embargoes.61 In practice, these aspects of Rule (1) 
cause no enforcement mistakes, but the Court’s inexact explanations feed 
claims of incoherence. 
The word discrimination in the rule implies comparative disadvantage, 
that is, taxing or regulating imports or exports more severely than competing 
internal sales. In most reported decisions, that is the case, but the rule also 
                                                                                                                           
 
56 Philadelphia v. New Jersey, 437 U.S. 617 (1976). This is often cited as the Court’s lead decision, 
and it is featured in most casebooks. Its unusual feature was the state’s attempt to forbid imports of trash; 
the “good” being protected was access to state landfills. 
57 See id. at 624 (“Thus, where simple economic protectionism is effected by state legislation, a 
virtually per se rule of invalidity has been erected.”). 
58 See Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131 (1986) (sustaining a quarantine). No Court opinion says that 
only quarantines work, but no other successful defense has been reported. For a failed attempt to invoke 
the quarantine rulings, see Philadelphia, 437 U.S. at 628–29. 
59 The routine defense that appears in many decisions including Tenn. Wine argues that the 
protectionist law at issue is necessary for health and safety. The Court patiently explains why it is not. See 
Tenn. Wine, 139 S. Ct. at 2474–76. 
60 E.g., Commonwealth Edison Co. v. Montana, 453 U.S. 609, 617–29 (1981) (sustaining hefty 
state severance tax on coal that was mostly exported to other states); Minnesota v. Clover Leaf Creamery 
Co., 449 U.S. 456 (1981) (sustaining state ban on plastic retail milk containers that were all imported); 
Exxon Corp. v. Governor of Md., 437 U.S. 117 (1978) (sustaining state ban on petroleum retailers owned 
by external refiners). 
61 E.g., Hunt v. Wash. State Apple Advert. Comm’n, 432 U.S. 333 (1977) (overturning state ban 
on labeling sources of apples); Collins v. New Hampshire, 170 U.S. 30 (1898) (overturning state 
requirement that margarine sold as food be colored pink); Mapco v. Grunder, 470 F. Supp. 401 (N.D. 
Ohio 1979) (overturning Ohio tax that discriminated against low-sulfur coal, all imported). 
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forbids laws that remove market advantages of imports or exports; the state 
claims to be equalizing interstate with internal transactions.62 This shows up 
directly when a regulatory scheme imposes minimum prices on both local 
and imported goods to prop up internal producers.63 These purportedly 
neutral measures defeat the economic purpose of a common market, to favor 
efficiency, just as much as rules that make imports more expensive than local 
products. The Court’s decisions forbid such price controls but do so based on 
the misleading claim that the state is attempting to regulate activities outside 
the state, which causes confusion for other kinds of cases.64 
Harder cases could arise if a state’s nonprotectionist regulatory policy 
imposed costs on internal production or sales, and it imposed an equalizing 
tariff on imports or exports. This would impair the efficiency purpose of 
common markets to pursue a competing social objective such as 
environmental preservation or social equity. No such claim has been 
reported.65 
Rule (2) gives critics more red meat because its basic formulation is 
opaque, forbidding “undue burdens” on interstate commerce.66 Its most 
frequently cited expression is a very general balancing test: state laws that do 
not violate Rule (1) will be upheld unless the burden on interstate commerce 
is “clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.”67 The issue is, 
again, whether states impose disadvantages on interstate commerce, albeit 
indirect and as a matter of degree, in contrast to Rule (1)’s categorical 
discriminations. In practice, the burdens that can invalidate state laws are 
reasonably specific. One is taxes and fees that are multiplied when imposed 
                                                                                                                           
 
62 E.g., S. Cent. Bell Tel. Co. v. Alabama, 526 U.S. 160, 169–70 (1999). 
63 E.g., Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935). 
64 Id. at 522; Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 330 (1989); Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. 
State Liquor Auth., 476 U.S. 573, 582 (1986). For discussion of the confusion, see infra notes 100–22 and 
accompanying text. 
65 However, state regulations imposed on interstate businesses are the frequent basis for Rule (2) 
claims. See infra notes 100–22 and accompanying text. 
66 See South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2098 (2018). 
67 Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970). The Court unanimously overturned a state 
law that violated Rule (1); the quoted statement was dictum. See also Energy & Env’t Legal Inst. v. Epel, 
793 F.3d 1169, 1171 (10th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 595 (2015) (opinion of Gorsuch, J.: “By 
any reckoning, that’s a pretty grand, even ‘ineffable,’ all-things-considered sort of test, one requiring 
judges (to attempt) to compare wholly incommensurable goods for wholly different populations 
(measuring the burdens on out-of-staters against the benefits to in-staters.”) (upheld state requirement for 
use of renewable energy). 
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on interstate activities. An important Rule (2) remedy requires that they be 
apportioned to the share of taxable activity in each state.68 Another is barriers 
to interstate shipments that mostly (sometimes exclusively) burden 
commerce in transit through a state.69 The third is multiple or conflicting 
regulations that burden interstate actors who must comply with more than 
one scheme or with conflicting rules.70 No overall explanation appears in any 
Court opinion; this summary is based on compiling decisions that overturned 
or sustained state laws. Moreover, as the word “undue” and wording of the 
Court’s balancing test “clearly excessive” imply, Rule (2) invalidates laws 
only when these burdens are severe and immune to internal correction. This 
is particularly important for review of claims based on multiple or conflicting 
regulations. Multistate businesses must comply with lots of reasonable local 
laws in each state or city. Common market issues arise only when regulations 
apply mostly to interstate activities, burdens are severe, and states lack good 
policy justifications.71 
Rule (3), by sustaining protectionist state subsidies, is a domestic 
exception to common market theory; EU and GATT/WTO rules restrict 
subsidies.72 This ought to please critics of the Doctrine, but the rule has a 
complicating effect when legal schemes mix subsidies with regulations or 
                                                                                                                           
 
68 See Complete Auto Transit, Inc. v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274 (1977) (explaining apportionment; 
unanimous Court). The Court’s first remedy restricted taxation of ships to the state of their home port, 
adopted by the Taney Court in Hays v. Pac. Mail SS Co., 58 U.S. (17 How.) 596 (1855) (holding a ship 
with home port in New York could not be taxed based on its visits to California). The Court invoked no 
explicit legal theory but stated, “Now, it is quite apparent that if the State of California possessed the 
authority to impose the tax in question, any other State in the Union, into the ports of which the vessels 
entered in the prosecution of their trade and business, might also impose a like tax.” Id. at 599. 
Pennsylvania imposed an apportioned tax on railroad property, which the Court sustained—its first 
approval of apportionment. Pullman’s Palace Car Co. v. Pennsylvania, 141 U.S. 18 (1891). Much later 
the apportionment rule supplanted the home port rule for ships. Ott v. Miss. Valley Barge Line Co., 336 
U.S. 169 (1949). 
69 E.g., S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 U.S. 761, 775 (1945) (overturned state regulation of train 
lengths). See also infra notes 75–82 and accompanying text. 
70 E.g., Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982) (overturned state law regulating hostile 
corporate takeovers); Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520 (1959) (involved conflicting 
requirements for trucks’ mud-flaps; Illinois law overturned). On Edgar, see infra notes 103–09 and 
accompanying text. 
71 See discussion infra notes 100–22 and accompanying text. 
72 On GATT/WTO and subsidies, see Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, WORLD TRADE 
ORG., https://www.wto.org/english/tratope/scme/scme.htm (last visited Aug. 11, 2020). On EU and 
subsidies, see Treaty of Rome Article 92, Mar. 25, 1957, 298 U.N.T.S. 3. See supra note 23 for linked 
site. 
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taxes. Complex and difficult cases can result, feeding the incoherency 
attack.73 Instances of this problem are few and confined, but that does not 
restrain critics. A further problem for Rule (3) is imprecision of its “market 
participant” label and definition.74 
Any review of coherence should include the case about Iowa’s truck 
length limits that is featured in most Constitutional Law casebooks and cited 
in many judicial opinions.75 The state forbade most trucks longer than 55 feet; 
other states allowed 65-foot trucks. The Rule (2) issue was whether Iowa had 
imposed undue burdens on commerce in transit through the state. Truckers 
sued, relying on a decision three years before that had unanimously 
overturned a similar Wisconsin statute.76 Four justices dutifully voted to 
follow the precedent.77 Three dissented based on the odd claim that Iowa had 
tried harder to defend its law than had Wisconsin.78 The other two voted 
against Iowa based on a novel discrimination theory with no basis in common 
market doctrine.79 The case allows teachers to make helpful points about 
political theory by distinguishing the Iowa and Wisconsin decisions from an 
earlier case in which the Court unanimously sustained South Carolina’s limit 
                                                                                                                           
 
73 Two very complex decisions involved state regulation of trash disposal, a subject that seems to 
generate schemes mixing subsidies and regulations. United Haulers Ass’n, Inc. v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid 
Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 330 (2007) (upheld law, 5-3 vote); C & A Carbone v. Town of Clarkstown, 
511 U.S. 383 (1994) (invalidated law, 6-3 vote). For simpler cases involving taxes and subsidies, see W. 
Lynn Creamery v. Healy, 512 U.S. 186 (1994) (held state tax invalid; 2 dissenters); New Energy Co. of 
Indiana v. Limbach, 486 U.S. 269 (1988) (held state tax invalid; Scalia, J. for unanimous Court). See also 
Dep’t of Revenue v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328 (2007) (held municipal bond favoritism justified by subsidy 
exception); South-Central Timber Dev. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82 (1984) (held subsidy exception did not 
allow state to restrict resale of subsidized timber). 
74 The Court first confronted the subsidy issue in Hughes v. Alexandria Scrap Corp., 426 U.S. 794, 
808 (1976), where it described a state bounty for junked cars as the state entering “the market as a 
purchaser.” Next, in Reeves, Inc. v. Stake, 447 U.S. 429, 436 (1980), it referred to sale of state-owned 
cement to residents at a below-market price as the state acting as a “market participant,” and this became 
the usual tag for the exception. However, it applies to any subsidy, whether or not made in a market 
purchase or sale. Some opinions do refer to subsidies. E.g., New Energy Co., 486 U.S. 269 passim (1988) 
(Scalia, J.). 
75 Kassel v. Consol. Freightways, 450 U.S. 662 (1981). See, e.g., GEOFFREY R. STONE ET AL., 
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 267–73 (8th ed. 2018). 
76 Kassel, 450 U.S. at 668 (citing Raymond Motor Transp. v. Rice, 434 U.S. 429 (1978)). 
77 Id. at 664 (Powell, J., plurality opinion). 
78 See id. at 687–706 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Skill of a state’s lawyers is hardly a sound basis 
for a common market rule. This opinion included the self-fulfilling remark that the “jurisprudence of the 
‘negative side’ of the Commerce Clause remains hopelessly confused.” Id. at 706. 
79 Id. at 679 (Brennan, J., concurring). The theory never appeared in any other Supreme Court 
opinion. It was likely a futile attempt to define a more precise rule. 
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on truck lengths.80 Iowa and Wisconsin had made numerous exceptions 
allowing longer trucks for any local firm that asked for one.81 These 
undermined their safety claims and eliminated local political pressures that 
would otherwise adjust state rules to market practices. South Carolina had 
made no such exceptions, allowing correction by local politics.82 
3. Errors 
On occasion, the Supreme Court’s attempts to define an appropriate 
common-market rule for a state’s imports from other states overcompensated 
for state bias to favor interstate over intrastate transactions. These have been 
corrected but sometimes too slowly, fueling criticism of the Doctrine. One 
began in 1827, when the Court overturned a Maryland license fee imposed 
on importers of foreign goods, defining the fee as an import duty expressly 
forbidden by the Import-Export Clause.83 After the Civil War, the Court 
morphed that precedent into broad immunity from state laws of goods that 
are imported into a state from other states or foreign nations so long as the 
goods are in their original packages.84 The rule was perhaps useful to protect 
imported goods in transit through a coastal state, but it created a tax 
preference for imported goods in receiving states. Worse, the Court applied 
it to imports of alcoholic drinks into states that had banned them altogether.85 
This undermined state prohibition laws until Congress intervened to override 
                                                                                                                           
 
80 South Carolina State Hwy. Dept. v. Barnwell Bros., 303 U.S. 177 (1938). Cf. Sproles v. Binford, 
286 U.S. 374 (1932) (sustained Texas limits on truck size and weight; minimal showing of burden on 
interstate commerce). 
81 Kassel, 450 U.S. at 665–66, 675–77. The opinion implied, but failed to specify, that the state’s 
restriction mostly burdened commerce in transit through the state—interests with almost no political 
influence in the state. 
82 Soon after the Court’s decision, the South Carolina Legislature amended its laws to conform to 
trucking industry norms. Barnwell, 303 U.S. at 180–84. 40 S.C. STAT. Act No. 845, art. III, §§ 1, 6–7 
(1938); S.C. CODE § 1617 (Supp. 1938). 
The Kassel Court discussed the safety issue extensively and noted its effect on Iowan politics. 
Kassel, 450 U.S. at 667–77. It cited Barnwell as well as Raymond. Id. at 670. 
83 Brown, 25 U.S. at 437–45 (1827) (alternative holding, applying U.S. CONST. art. I § 10 cl. 2). 
The other basis for the holding was based on an early version of Rule (1) discrimination. Id. at 445–48. 
See also supra note 15 and accompanying text. 
84 Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U.S. 100 (1890). Three justices dissented. Brown v. Maryland, had planted 
the seed with its dictum, “we suppose the principles laid down in this case, to apply equally to importations 
from a sister State.” Brown, 25 U.S. at 449. 
85 See id. 
 
146 JOURNAL OF LAW AND COMMERCE [Vol. 39:131 
 
Vol. 39, No. 2 (2021) ● ISSN: 2164-7984 (online) ● ISSN 0733-2491 (print)  
DOI 10.5195/jlc.2021.212 ● http://jlc.law.pitt.edu 
the “original package doctrine” as applied to alcohol bans.86 Much later, the 
Court repealed the Doctrine altogether.87 
Another, more complex, mistake arose from the Court’s attempts to 
address state tax changes inspired by the Great Depression. During the 
Doctrine’s 19th century development, the Court outlawed Rule (1) tax 
discriminations and addressed the Rule (2) problem of multiple taxation by 
imposing, first, its homeport-only rule for ships, then the duty of 
apportionment for railroad property and gross receipts.88 That worked for 
common forms of taxation of that era. The Depression induced many states 
to impose new sales and income taxes. These generated new forms of 
potential multiple taxation when both the seller’s and buyer’s state could tax 
an interstate transaction. In the cases reaching the Court, only one of the 
states was taxing sales; multiple taxation was only potential. But 
apportionment seemed a doubtful remedy. The issue was clearly laid out in a 
1946 concurring opinion by Justice Rutledge, who also proposed a sensible 
solution: the receiving state could impose its use tax on the sale. If the seller’s 
state taxed the same transaction, it would have to credit tax paid to the buyer’s 
state to avoid multiple taxation.89 But no other Justice joined his opinion. 
Instead, the Court toyed with a rule forbidding any state tax imposed 
“directly” on “the privilege of doing business” in interstate commerce.90 That 
rule favored interstate over intrastate commerce, but it could be avoided by 
careful drafting, and the Court overruled it.91 
                                                                                                                           
 
86 Webb-Kenyon Act, 27 U.S.C. § 122. Congress had to try twice. See Tenn. Wine & Spirits 
Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 139 S. Ct. 2449, 2464–66 (2019). 
87 Limbach v. Hooven & Allison Co., 466 U.S. 353 (1984); Michelin Tire Corp. v. Wages, 423 
U.S. 276 (1976). 
88 See supra note 68 and accompanying text; Maine v. Grand Trunk Ry., 141 U.S. 217 (1891) 
(sustaining apportioned gross receipts tax). 
89 Freeman v. Hewitt, 329 U.S. 249, 259 (1946) (Rutledge, J., concurring). This required a judgment 
that the receiving state has the dominant interest in the transaction. As the text following shows, the Court 
in 2018 implicitly arrived at that idea by the back door. 
90 The theory was an alternative holding in Freeman; asserted by four dissenters in Memphis Nat. 
Gas Co. v. Stone, 335 U.S. 80, 99 (1948) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting); then became the opinion of the 
Court in Spector Motor Serv., 340 U.S. 602. It seems to have been a failed attempt to simplify. 
91 The Spector theory was undermined as states learned to draft around it, and it was unanimously 
overruled in Complete Auto Transit v. Brady, 430 U.S. 274, 288–89 (1977). See id. at 284–85 (“The 
Spector rule had come to operate only as a rule of draftsmanship and served only to distract the courts and 
parties from their inquiry into whether the challenged tax produced results forbidden by the Commerce 
Clause.”). 
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Some tax challengers asserted that a taxing state lacked sufficient 
contacts with parties it sought to tax in violation of either the Due Process 
Clause or the Commerce Clause or both. The Commerce Clause claim 
narrowly succeeded in a 1944 decision that overturned an Arkansas sales tax 
imposed on shipments into the state by sellers in other states.92 Justice 
Rutledge’s dissent carefully explained why that analysis was wrong.93 The 
question became more important as interstate shopping increased. A 1967 
decision held that a retailer could be required to collect and remit use taxes 
on interstate sales only if it had a physical presence in the receiving state.94 
Imposing the duty on other retailers denied both Due Process and Commerce 
Clause rights.95 The decision created a tax preference for interstate over local 
sales and was criticized and attacked.96 A confused 1992 decision reversed 
the Due Process ruling but retained the Commerce Clause rule.97 In 2018 a 
divided Court overruled the 1967 and 1992 decisions.98 However, none of 
                                                                                                                           
 
92 McLeod v. J.E. Dilworth Co., 322 U.S. 327, 339 (1944) (“[T]he sale—the transfer of 
ownership—was made in Tennessee. For Arkansas to impose a tax on such transactions would be to 
project its powers beyond its boundaries and to tax an interstate transaction.”) (5-4 decision). Cf. 
Wisconsin v. J.C. Penney Co., 311 U.S. 435, 446 (1940) (rejected Due Process attack on apportioned state 
tax on corporate dividends; 5-4 decision; Roberts, J., dissenting, said that Wisconsin had illegally taxed 
“outside her boundaries”). 
93 See Int’l Harvester Co. v. Dep’t of Treasury, 322 U.S. 340, 349 (1944) (opinion of Rutledge, J. 
in three related cases). 
94 Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc. v. Dep’t of Revenue, 386 U.S. 753 (1967). Three justices dissented. 
Despite similarity to McLeod, supra note 92, the Court did not cite it. 
95 Nat’l Bellas Hess, Inc., 386 U.S. 753. 
96 See, e.g., Paul J. Hartman, Collection of the Use Tax on Out-of-State Mail-Order Sales, 39 VAND. 
L. REV. 993, 994, 1006–15 (1986); Charles Rothfeld, Mail Order Sales and State Jurisdiction to Tax, 53 
TAX NOTES 1405, 1414–19 (1991); Bellas Hess, Quill, and Online Sales Tax Collection, 
BLOG.FEDTAX.NET, https://blog.fedtax.net/2012/04/25/bellas-hess-quill-and-online-sales-tax-collection/  
(last visited Aug. 11, 2020). The preference was practical, not formal. States could legally impose the use 
tax on each buyer, but collecting it was very difficult except for large businesses and motor vehicle 
purchases. See Henneford v. Silas Mason Co., 300 U.S. 577 (1937) (sustaining use tax on imported heavy 
machinery). 
97 Quill Corp. v. North Dakota, 504 U.S. 298 (1992). The Court unanimously overruled the due 
process rationale relied on in Nat’l Bellas Hess. The five-justice majority reaffirmed the dormant 
Commerce Clause holding of Nat’l Bellas Hess based on a flawed nexus argument. Three justices voted 
to reaffirm the commerce rationale based solely on stare decisis. Justice White’s lone dissent expressly 
relied on Justice Rutledge’s analysis to argue that Nat’l Bellas Hess be completely overruled. Justice 
White had voted with the Court in Nat’l Bellas Hess, so this was an all too rare example of a Justice 
admitting a mistake. See Nat’l Bellas Hess, 386 U.S. at 752. 
98 South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080 (2018). All nine justices agreed that Nat’l Bellas 
Hess was wrongly decided, and the majority of five overruled it. The four dissenters relied on stare decisis 
combined with Congress’s power to correct the error. The flaw in the latter position is that the Court 
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the governing opinions identified the common-market issue at stake: whether 
the rule was necessary to avoid “undue” multiple taxation of interstate sales.99 
The use tax battle was but one involved in a mistaken attempt to decide 
common market issues based on allegedly illegal extraterritoriality alone, 
that is, the claim that a state law violates the Doctrine, without more, because 
it tries to impose the state’s authority outside its boundaries. The concept is 
often traced to the 1935 decision in which the Supreme Court overturned a 
New York statute that imposed minimum wholesale prices on milk either 
produced in the state or imported from others.100 As explained above, this is 
a form of tariff that violates Rule (1) and was correctly invalidated.101 But the 
Court said it was because “New York has no power to project its legislation 
into Vermont by regulating the price to be paid in that state for milk acquired 
there.”102 
Another precedent often cited involved a Rule (2) issue. In 1982, the 
Court overturned an Illinois law that imposed extensive and burdensome 
regulations on hostile corporate takeovers of any company with significant 
local activities.103 The Court’s main opinion said that the statute violated the 
Commerce Clause on two alternative grounds. The first recited that invalidity 
was based on the statute’s “sweeping extraterritorial effect,” but it received 
only four votes.104 The second, based on Rule (2) conflicts with other states’ 
laws, received five votes and is properly designated the Court’s holding. Five 
years later, the Court sustained an Indiana statute regulating such takeovers 
but only for firms incorporated in the state.105 The latter case correctly 
described the issue as whether these laws subjected interstate firms to 
multiple and conflicting regulations that were burdensome enough to be 
                                                                                                                           
 
should protect the common market subject to exceptions imposed by Congress when it deems them 
necessary, not vice versa. 
99 The only opinion to do so was Justice White’s dissent in Quill Corp. Quill, 504 U.S. 298. 
100 Baldwin v. G.A.F. Seelig Inc., 294 U.S. 511 (1935). 
101 See supra notes 63–64 and accompanying text. 
102 Baldwin, 294 U.S. at 521. Earlier Supreme Court opinions made occasional reference to 
extraterritoriality in relation to dormant Commerce Clause issues. See, e.g., Fidelity & Deposit Co. v. 
Tafoya, 270 U.S. 426, 435 (1926); Shafer v. Farmers Grain Co., 268 U.S. 189, 199 (1925). 
103 Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624 (1982). 
104 Id. at 642, 626. The opinion relied on extraterritorial language in S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, a leading 
decision on the Rule (2) category of undue burdens on transit through a state. S. Pac. Co. v. Arizona, 325 
U.S. 761, 775 (1945); Edgar, 457 U.S. at 642–43. 
105 CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69 (1987). 
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“undue.”106 The problem was avoided by restricting regulatory authority to 
the state of incorporation (which of course means that Delaware’s rules 
dominate the field)107—the remedy that Justice Rutledge proposed in 1946.108 
But the extraterritorial language in the 1982 case is often cited.109 
Later in the 1980s, the Court overturned two state laws that imposed 
limits on commodity prices based on those charged in neighboring states.110 
As noted, these operate like tariffs and were properly struck down. But both 
opinions of the Court cited and relied on the extraterritorial passage in the 
1935 case.111 The second, Healy in 1989, made an extended discussion of and 
reliance on extraterritoriality that dominated the opinion. Justice Scalia 
concurred that the law violated Rule (1) but disagreed with the extraterritorial 
rationale, correctly pointing out that “innumerable valid state laws affect 
pricing decisions in other States.”112 
Thereafter, lawyers for businesses resisting state taxes or regulations 
invoked these precedents, particularly Healy, to persuade many lower federal 
courts that there is a per se Commerce Clause rule against 
extraterritoriality,113 or that there is an “extraterritoriality doctrine” with the 
                                                                                                                           
 
106 Id. at 88–89. The opinion was authored by Justice Powell, who refused to join the extraterritorial 
rationale in Edgar, 457 U.S. at 646. 
107 See 2019 Annual Report Statistics, DEL. DIV. CORP., http://corp.delaware.gov/stats/ (last visited 
Aug. 11, 2020) (67.8 % of Fortune 500 companies are incorporated in Delaware). 
108 See supra note 89 and accompanying text. 
109 See, e.g., Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989); Sam Francis Found. v. Christies, Inc., 
784 F.3d 1320, 1331 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 795 (2016); Dean Foods Co. v. 
Brancel, 187 F.3d 609, 615 (7th Cir. 1999). 
110 Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324; Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Auth., 
476 U.S. 573 (1986). 
111 Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. at 330; Brown-Forman, 476 U.S. at 582. 
112 Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. at 345. 
113 The purported per se rule first appeared in Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n v. Miller, 10 F.3d 633, 
638–40 (9th Cir. 1993), cert. denied, 511 U.S. 1033 (1994) (invalidated state law requiring specified due 
process rights for persons disciplined by NCAA). It was followed by Cotto Waxo Co. v. Williams, 46 F.3d 
790, 792–94 (8th Cir. 1995) (rejected extraterritorial attack on state’s ban on sale of petroleum-based 
sweeping compounds; remanded to apply balancing test), then Nat’l Solid Wastes Mgmt. Ass’n v. Meyer, 
63 F.3d 652 (7th Cir. 1995), cert. denied, 517 U.S. 1119 (1996) (invalidated state law that restricted access 
to state landfills to waste from locations with a recycling program meeting state standards) and Dean 
Foods Co. v. Brancel, 187 F.3d 609, 614–16 (7th Cir. 1999) (invalidated state’s milk pricing regulations 
as applied to exported milk). Other principal Courts of Appeals decisions reciting a per se rule: Johnson 
& Johnson Vision Care, Inc. v. Reyes, 665 Fed. App’x, 736, 741–21, 745–47 (10th Cir. 2016) (upheld 
state law regulating contact lens pricing); Chinatown Neighborhood Ass’n v. Harris, 794 F.3d 1136, 
1145–46 (9th Cir. 2015), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 2448 (2016) (upheld state law forbidding possession or 
sale of shark fins); Energy & Env’t Legal Inc. v. Epel, 793 F.3d 1169, 1172 (10th Cir. 2016) (Gorsuch, 
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J.), cert. denied, 136 S. Ct. 595 (2015) (upheld state requirement for use of renewable energy); Int’l Dairy 
Foods Ass’n v. Boggs, 622 F.3d 628, 645–48 (6th Cir. 2010) (held a state milk labeling regulation did not 
violate per se extraterritorial Commerce Clause rule); Quik Payday, Inc. v. Stork, 549 F.3d 1302, 1307–
09 (10th Cir. 2008), cert. denied, 556 U.S. 1209 (2009) (upheld state statutes regulating loans as applied); 
KT&G Corp. v. Att’y Gen of Okla., 535 F.3d 1114, 1143–46 (10th Cir. 2008) (upheld state statutes 
carrying out national cigarette settlement); Carolina Trucks & Equip., Inc. v. Volvo Trucks of N. Am. Inc., 
492 F.3d 484, 492 (4th Cir. 2007) (upheld state law limiting direct sales of cars by manufacturers); Grand 
River Enter. Six Nations v. Pryor, 425 F.3d 158, 168 (2d Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 549 U.S. 951 (2006), 
later appeal, 481 F.3d 60 (2d Cir. 2007) (plaintiffs alleged a claim that statutes carrying out national 
cigarette settlement agreement violated per se extraterritorial Commerce Clause rule but lost on the merits 
after remand); All. of Auto. Mfrs v. Gwadosky, 430 F.3d 30, 35 (1st Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1143 
(2006) (upheld state regulation of car makers’ warranty reimbursement of dealers); Pharm. Care Mgmt. 
Ass’n v. Rowe, 429 F.3d 294, 311–12 (1st Cir. 2005), cert. denied, 547 U.S. 1179 (2006) (upheld state 
law regulating prescription drugs); Freedom Holdings, Inc. v. Spitzer, 357 F.3d 205, 216 (2d Cir. 2004) 
(rejected commerce claim against state cigarette contraband statute); Southern Union Co. v. Missouri 
PUC, 289 F.3rd 503, 507–08 (8th Cir. 2002) (upheld state law regulating investments by public utilities); 
S.D. Myers, Inc. v. City & County of San Francisco, 253 F.3d 461, 470 (9th Cir. 2001) (upheld city 
ordinance that required contractors to provide benefits to registered domestic partners); Pharm. Rsch. & 
Mfrs. of Am. v. Concannon, 249 F.3d 66, 79–82 (1st Cir. 2001), aff’d, 538 U.S. 644 (2003) (upheld state 
prescription drug pricing law; Supreme Court affirmed denial of externality claim without calling it a 
doctrine or per se rule). 
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same effect.114 Academic commentary focused on the latter version.115 
Another set of decisions recognized extraterritoriality as a separate 
Commerce Clause category without calling it a doctrine or per se rule.116 
                                                                                                                           
 
114 The phrase appeared in a judicial opinion that rejected the claim based on it in IMS Health, Inc. 
IMS Health, Inc. v. Mills, 616 F.3d 7, 29, 30 (1st Cir. 2010) (data privacy case). It appeared in an opinion 
in which it was applied it to overturn a state law in Am. Beverage Ass’n. Am. Beverage Ass’n v. Snyder, 
735 F.3d 362 passim (6th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 571 U.S. 817 (2013). Other principal decisions by U.S. 
Courts of Appeals: Ammex, Inc. v. Wenk, 936 F.3d 355, 369 (6th Cir. 2019) (Bush, C.J., concurring) 
(upheld state gasoline-volatility regulation); Vizio, Inc. v. Klee, 886 F.3d 249, 256 (2d Cir. 2018) (upheld 
state recycling law); Sam Francis Found. v. Christies, Inc., 784 F.3d 1320 (9th Cir. 2015) (en banc), cert. 
denied, 136 S. Ct. 795 (2016) (overturned state law imposing royalty on out-of-state sales of residents’ 
art); Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey, 730 F.3d 1070, 1101 (9th Cir. 2013), cert. denied, 573 
U.S. 946 (2014) (upheld state regulation of ethanol used in motor fuel). See Daniels Sharpsmart, Inc. v. 
Smith, 889 F.3d 608 (9th Cir. 2018) (affirmed District Court decision enforcing “extraterritorial doctrine” 
claim that state waste disposal law was invalid as applied); Ass’n for Accessible Meds. v. Frosh, 887 F.3d 
664, 675 (4th Cir. 2018), cert. denied, 139 S. Ct. 1168 (2019) (overturned state law regulating prescription 
drug prices based on claim labeled “extraterritorial doctrine” by dissent); North Dakota v. Heydinger, 825 
F.3d 912 (8th Cir. 2016) (overturned, based on preemption, state law forbidding electric power purchases 
that would increase statewide power sector carbon dioxide emissions; affirmed trial court that had relied 
on “extraterritoriality doctrine”). 
115 Donald Regan, Siamese Essays: (I) CTS Corp. v. Dynamics Corp. of America and Dormant 
Commerce Clause Doctrine; (II) Extraterritorial State Legislation, 85 MICH. L. REV. 1865, 1873 (1987) 
(a pre-Healy article). Regan used the term “extraterritoriality principle” to describe several legal doctrines 
and discussed references to extraterritoriality in Edgar v. MITE Corp., 457 U.S. 624. But he said the 
concept was not properly part of dormant Commerce Clause law. “The extraterritoriality doctrine” to 
describe an alleged dormant Commerce Clause rule appeared in Kirsten H. Engel, The Dormant 
Commerce Clause Threat to Market-Based Environmental Regulation: The Case of Electricity 
Deregulation, 26 ECOLOGY L.Q. 243, 342, 344 (1999) (relying on Regan). See also Jack L. Goldsmith & 
Alan O. Sykes, The Internet and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 110 YALE L.J. 785, 803–06, 827 (2001); 
Brannon P. Denning, Extraterritoriality and the Dormant Commerce Clause: A Doctrinal Post-Mortem, 
73 LA. L. REV. 979 (2013); Susan Lourde Martin, The Extraterritoriality Doctrine of the Dormant 
Commerce Clause Is Not Dead, 100 MARQ. L. REV. 497 (2016) (reviewing more than 30 lower court 
decisions in which extraterritoriality claims were made). In addition to Professor Regan, authors 
Goldsmith, Sykes, and Denning argue that extraterritoriality is not a proper dormant Commerce Clause 
rule. 
116 E.g., Midwest Title Loans, Inc. v. Mills, 593 F.3d 660 (7th Cir. 2010), cert. denied, 562 U.S. 
829 (2010) (Posner, J.) (invalidated state law regulating car loans as applied to out-of-state lender); 
Selevan v. N.Y. Thruway Auth., 584 F.3d 82, 90 (2d Cir. 2009), after remand, 711 F.3d 253 (2d Cir. 
2012) (claim that Thruway’s tolls invalid per dormant Commerce Clause stated a cause of action, but lost 
on remand); Grand River Enters. Six Nations, Ltd. v. Beebe, 574 F.3d 929, 943–44 (8th Cir. 2009), cert. 
denied, 559 U.S. 1068 (2010) (upheld state escrow statute carrying out national cigarette settlement); 
Bainbridge v. Turner, 311 F.3d 1104, 1110–11 (11th Cir. 2002) (Rule (1) violation; extraterritoriality 
claim recited in passing); Nat’l Elec. Mfrs. Ass’n v. Sorrell, 272 F.3d 104, 110–12 (2d Cir. 2001), cert. 
denied, 536 U.S. 905 (2002) (upheld state law regulating labels for products containing mercury). 
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States are barred from regulating external activities to which they lack 
minimum contacts by the Due Process Clause.117 But in reported Commerce 
Clause cases, states regulate parties operating within their boundaries. The 
common market issue is whether these regulations overburden interstate 
transactions because they subject interstate firms to multiple and conflicting 
laws and thus disadvantage them compared with local companies. Interstate 
business must comply with numerous local laws that differ from those of 
other states; that is inherent in a federal system. The costs of doing so are 
compatible with our common market except for extreme (“undue,” “clearly 
excessive”) cases.118 The challenge for courts is to define them. Trying to do 
so by labeling regulations extraterritorial oversimplifies the question; too 
many state laws have external effects. Proper criteria are: whether a 
regulation’s effects on interstate activities dominate over local activities, 
whether compliance by interstate firms with every state’s law would impose 
extreme costs, whether the regulating state has a reasonable, nonprotectionist 
purpose,119 whether the state is correcting a market failure, and whether the 
regulation would have the retroactive effect of unduly impairing investments 
in interstate facilities.120 
Has the erroneous test of extraterritoriality led to incorrect results? So 
far, the problem is more rhetorical than real. No Supreme Court opinion used 
the phrase “extraterritoriality doctrine” or said there is a per se rule against 
extraterritoriality, and its decisions that relied on the concept as a factor seem 
clearly correct in result.121 Many lower court opinions recited a per se rule, 
but most rejected claims based on the concept, and those that invalidated 
often included proper analysis of conflicts.122 However, lawsuits will 
                                                                                                                           
 
117 World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 222 U.S. 286 (1980). 
118 See supra notes 66–71 and accompanying text. 
119 For a case in which the asserted state purpose was obsolete, see Bendix Autolite Corp. v. 
Midwesco Enters., Inc., 486 U.S. 888 (1988) (overturning state rule that burdened small interstate firms). 
120 See, e.g., Heydinger, 825 F.3d at 912. 
121 See supra notes 63–64, 100, 110–12 and accompanying text. 
122 Five decisions in notes 113–14, 116, supra overturned state laws. The two in which 
exterritoriality seemed to be the sole basis to invalidate were Am. Beverage Ass’n, 735 F.3d 362 passim, 
and Meyer, 63 F.3d 652. However, in both, the courts pointed out less burdensome ways the state could 
achieve its purpose. Am. Beverage Ass’n, 735 F.3d at 375, 376; Meyer, 63 F.3d at 662–63. Curiously, a 
concurring opinion nicely laid out why the extraterritoriality rule was mistaken, then relied on it. Am. 
Beverage Ass’n, 735 F.3d at 377–81 (Sutton, J.). In sum, extraterritoriality has so far not seemed to 
generate clearly erroneous holdings. However, some scholars argue that the Doctrine is a threat to the 
environment. See Kayla Rice, A Tale of Two Portlands: How Port Cities Can Survive Dormant Commerce 
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continue to assert the extraterritoriality claim. Our common market will be 
better served by dropping this shortcut. 
C. Risk of Repeal 
As noted, three Justices voted to overturn the Doctrine in the 1997 
Camps case, and politics supported new Supreme Court appointments by 
Republican presidents to be grounded in the doctrines of original intent and 
textualism.123 Of course the political focus for appointments was not on the 
Doctrine; effects on it were a byproduct.124 Moreover, liberal and centrist 
Justices have deviated from the Doctrine in the past.125 Whether new justices 
will support or oppose the Doctrine cannot be certain until they have 
committed themselves. Three Justices who sat in the 1997 case, two in 
dissent, continued to serve in 2019.126 Would the six replacements add 
enough votes to overturn the Doctrine? Prior votes gave reason to forecast 
one vote each way; the other four were uncertain.127 Tennessee Wine 
                                                                                                                           
 
Clause Challenges to Fossil Fuel Shipping Restrictions, 26 HASTINGS W.-NW. J. ENV’T L. & POL’Y 81 
(2020); Sam Kalen & Steven Weissman, The Electric Grid Confronts the Dormant Commerce Clause, 45 
ECOLOGY L. CURRENTS 132 (2018); Jeffrey M. Schmitt, Making Sense of Extraterritoriality: Why 
California’s Progressive Global Warming and Animal Welfare Legislation Does Not Violate the Dormant 
Commerce Clause, 39 HARV. ENV’T L. REV. 423 (2015); Anthony L. Moffa & Stephanie L. Safdi, 
Freedom from the Costs of Trade: A Principled Argument Against Dormant Commerce Clause Scrutiny 
of Goods Movement Policies, 21 N.Y.U. ENV’T L.J. 344 (2014); Thomas Alcorn, The Constitutionality of 
California’s Cap-and-Trade Program and Recommendations for Design of Future State Programs, 3 
MICH. J. ENV’T & ADMIN. L. 87 (2013); Sam Kalen, Dormancy Versus Innovation: A Next Generation 
Dormant Commerce Clause, 65 OKLA. L. REV. 381 (2013); Engel, supra note 115. None of these articles 
isolates on extraterritoriality, although all discuss it. 
123 See supra notes 31, 36, and accompanying text. 
124 The issues that mattered were politically important, such as abortion, guns, religion, and gay 
rights. See Jason Zengerie, How the Trump Administration Is Remaking the Courts, N.Y. TIMES (Aug. 20, 
2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/08/22/magazine/trump-remaking-courts-judiciary.html?smid=tw-
nytmag&smtyp=cur. 
125 See supra notes 29–30 and accompanying text. 
126 See Camps Newfound/Owatonna v. Town of Harrison, 520 U.S. 564 (1997) (Thomas, Ginsburg 
& Breyer, JJ.). 
127 Justice Alito, author of the Tenn. Wine opinion, had strongly supported the Doctrine. See 
Comptroller of the Treasury v. Wynne, 575 U.S. 542 (2015); Dep’t of Revenue v. Davis, 553 U.S. 328, 
376 (Alito, J., dissenting); United Haulers Ass’n v. Oneida-Herkimer Solid Waste Mgmt. Auth., 550 U.S. 
330, 355 (2007) (Alito, Stevens & Kennedy, JJ., dissenting). Justice Gorsuch had expressed opposition to 
it. South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., 138 S. Ct. 2080, 2100–01 (2018) (Gorsuch, J., concurring). Both voted 
accordingly in Tenn. Wine. Decisions of Chief Justice Roberts and Justices Sotomayor, Kagan, or 
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eliminated any doubt. Seven joined the Court’s opinion finding that the 
Doctrine is consistent with original intent and has sufficient grounding in the 
text. Earlier calls for repeal were expressly and politely acknowledged but 
rejected.128 There will be lots of disputes and disagreements about how the 
Court should define the American common market, but for some years to 
come, its existence is not threatened. 
II. THE TWENTY-FIRST AMENDMENT 
Tennessee Wine’s interpretation of the Twenty-first Amendment was far 
less important than its reaffirmation of the dormant Commerce Clause 
doctrine. But it had a like effect, to resolve uncertainty on the Court. The 
Tennessee statute reviewed by the Court had protected established wine and 
liquor package retailers from new competition by requiring two years’ 
residence in the state to qualify for a license.129 The rule was invalid under 
Rule (1) unless the Doctrine were disabled by Section 2 of the Amendment. 
This section literally immunizes all state laws regulating their alcohol 
imports from all older provisions of the Constitution: the Bill of Rights, the 
Fourteenth Amendment, the Ex Post Facto Clause, and of course the 
Commerce Clause.130 The Court has often held that the Amendment cannot 
                                                                                                                           
 
Kavanaugh, from their appointments until 2019, did not show clear commitments either way. All four 
joined the Tenn. Wine majority. 
128 Tenn. Wine & Spirits Retailers Ass’n v. Thomas, 139 S. Ct. 2449, 2460 (2019) (citing and 
acknowledging “vigorous and thoughtful critiques” by Scalia, Thomas & Gorsuch, JJ.). 
129 Three state rules were attacked in the case. In addition to the two-year residence rule described 
in the text, the second Tennessee rule required that applicants for renewal of a retail license be state 
residents for at least ten years, and an initial license of a two-year resident had to be renewed after one 
year. The third rule forbade licenses to any corporation with even one nonresident shareholder and 
required all resident shareholders to meet the residence rules for persons. This outlawed licenses to 
publicly traded corporations. All three rules were overturned in the lower courts, but petitioner defended 
only the two-year residence rule in the Supreme Court. Tenn. Wine, 139 S. Ct. at 2456–57. However, the 
theory of the Tenn. Wine dissent would have revived all of them. See Tenn. Wine, 139 S. Ct. at 2476–84 
(Gorsuch, J., dissenting). 
130 See 139 S. Ct. at 2468–69. The text of U.S. CONST. amend. XXI, § 2 states: 
The transportation or importation into any State, Territory, or possession of the United States 
for delivery or use therein of intoxicating liquors, in violation of the laws thereof, is hereby 
prohibited. 
Two related novel twists in the case had opposing implications. On the one hand, amend. XXI, § 2 literally 
applies only to imported goods, not to duration of residence rules. On the other, Rule (1) precedents had 
involved discriminations against imported goods, not against new residents. The Court noted both points, 
passed over the former, and had no trouble deciding that the latter violated Rule (1). Tenn. Wine, 139 S. 
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be read literally.131 But some Justices claimed an exception for the Doctrine 
and voted to sustain state discriminations against alcohol imports.132 These 
were dissenting votes, but the most recent decision, in 2005, garnered four of 
them.133 With but one more vote, an alcohol exception would be adopted. By 
2019, there were again six new Justices who might supply votes to reverse. 
Instead, the Court reaffirmed application of the Doctrine to interstate 
commerce in alcohol by the same 7-2 vote that reaffirmed the Doctrine.134 
CONCLUSION 
The Tennessee Wine decision had the unusual effect of resolving an 
issue not argued to the Court. In 1997 three Justices called for abolition of 
the dormant Commerce Clause doctrine that defines and protects the 
American common market. They argued that the Doctrine was inconsistent 
with the tenets of original intent and textualism and was incoherent. Political 
support for new appointments to the Court to be based on those doctrines 
raised the possibility that three in 1997 would become at least five in 2019. 
Instead, seven Justices joined an opinion finding the Doctrine consistent with 
those doctrines and, implicitly, not incoherent. Hence the American common 
market will continue to be defended by the Court for the foreseeable future. 
                                                                                                                           
 
Ct. at 2470–72. The residence rule also implicated two other constitutional doctrines. The Court addresses 
non-commercial duration of residence rules based on the Fourteenth Amendment. See supra note 21. The 
Tenn. Wine rule also discriminated against nonresidents. This violates U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 2 applied to 
natural persons and partnerships. Both doctrines were ignored in Tenn. Wine. See Tenn. Wine, 139 S. Ct. 
2449. 
131 Tenn. Wine, 139 S. Ct. at 2462 (“This would mean, among other things, that a state law 
prohibiting the importation of alcohol for sale to persons of a particular race, religion, or sex would be 
immunized from challenge under the Equal Protection Clause. Similarly, if a state law prohibited the 
importation of alcohol for sale by proprietors who had expressed an unpopular point of view on an 
important public issue, the First Amendment would provide no protection.”). 
132 Granholm v. Heald, 544 U.S. 460, 497 (2005) (Thomas, Rehnquist, Stevens & O’Connor, JJ., 
dissenting); Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. at 348 (1989) (Rehnquist, Stevens & O’Connor, JJ., dissenting); 
324 Liquor Corp. v. Duffy, 479 U.S. 335, 359 (1987) (Rehnquist & O’Connor, JJ., dissenting); Brown-
Forman Distillers Corp., 476 U.S. at 586 (White, Rehnquist & Stevens, JJ., dissenting); Hostetter v. 
Idlewild Bon Voyage Liquor Corp., 377 U.S. 324, 340 (1964) (Black & Goldberg, JJ., dissenting); 
Bacchus Imports, Ltd. v. Dias, 468 U.S. 263 (1984) (Rehnquist, Stevens & O’Connor, JJ., dissenting). 
133 Granholm, 544 U.S. 460. Many of the points in the Tenn. Wine opinion were covered in the 
Court’s Granholm opinion but for only five justices. Tenn. Wine, in effect, solidified Granholm, which it 
freely cited. 
134 Tenn. Wine, 139 S. Ct. at 2462–74. Notwithstanding, the court in Lebamoff Enterprises, Inc. v. 
Whitmer, 956 F.3d 863 (6th Cir. 2020), sustained an amend. XXI, § 2 defense to a state law. The decision’s 
attempt to distinguish Tenn. Wine was doubtful. See Lebamoff Enterprises, Inc., 956 F.3d at 869–75. 
